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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Steven D. Benjamin*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past year, the Virginia Court of Appeals continued to
be the primary contributor to the development of substantive and
procedural criminal law in Virginia. As it has in years past, the
court ruled on numerous Fourth Amendment questions, particu-
larly with respect to investigatory detention. Other significant rul-
ings dealt with double jeopardy, discovery, due process, and trial
procedure.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Detention
The court was particularly active in its review of challenges to
the lawfulness of police/citizen encounters. In a number of cases,
the court found the circumstances sufficient to create the reasona-
ble suspicion necessary to justify the investigatory detention of the
defendant.'
In an equal number of cases, however, the court ruled that the
officers' actions were not justified.2 In Moore v. Commonwealth,3
* Steven D. Benjamin & Associates, Richmond, Virginia; B.A., 1976, East Carolina Uni-
versity; J.D., 1979, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
1. See Quigley v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 28, 414 S.E.2d 851 (1992) (reasonable sus-
picion existed where defendant fled after receiving telephone call warning her of investiga-
tion); Commonwealth v. Eaves, 13 Va. App. 162, 408 S.E.2d 925 (1991) (pertinent circum-
stances created a reasonable suspicion justifying the defendant's detention); Hall v.
Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 559, 389 S.E.2d 921 (1991) (campus police officers exceeded
their powers of arrest, but properly made a warrantless citizen's arrest); Jacques v. Com-
monwealth, 12 Va. App. 591, 405 S.E.2d 630 (1991) (the stop of the defendant's automobile
and his detention were lawful); Troncoso v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 942, 407 S.E.2d 349
(1991) (investigatory detention and subsequent arrest were proper); Dixon v. Common-
wealth, 11 Va. App. 554, 399 S.E.2d 831 (1991) (investigatory detention and frisk were law-
ful); see also Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 191, 413 S.E.2d 645 (1992) (initial encoun-
ter not a seizure).
2. Riley v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 494, 412 S.E.2d 724 (1992); Adams v. Common-
wealth, 12 Va. App. 37, 402 S.E.2d 496 (1991); Moore v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 404,
404 S.E.2d 77 (1991); Waugh v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 620, 405 S.E.2d 429 (1991);
Hall v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 972, 406 S.E.2d 674 (1991); Smith v. Commonwealth, 12
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the police officer made a lawful traffic stop (for speeding) of a man
he knew to be under surveillance by other officers. The defendant
appeared nervous; he stammered, and his hands shook. Fearing for
his safety, the officer frisked the defendant, and removed a hard
object which was heroin. The court held that the officer's own as-
sessment of the severity of the defendant's nervousness did not
justify the frisk.4
In Smith v. Commonwealth5 an officer saw the defendant stand-
ing in a playground where drugs were prevalent. When the defend-
ant saw the officer, he jammed something into the front of his
sweat pants. Suspicious, the officer detained and frisked the de-
fendant, and subsequently found cocaine when he looked inside
the man's pants. Citing similar cases in which detentions were
based on officers' hunches, a panel of the Virginia Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court's conviction.6
In Adams v. Commonwealth,7 an informant told a narcotics
detective that he had seen "Mousey," whom he described, dis-
tribute drugs from a particular hotel room. The detective obtained
a search warrant for the room, but by the time he arrived to con-
duct the search, the occupants had checked out. The hotel clerk
told him that two males, one of whom matched the general
description of "Mousey," had just left the hotel, and were walking
on Midlothian Turnpike. Twenty minutes later, the detective lo-
cated two black males a quarter of a mile from the hotel. The
detective frisked the man he believed to be "Mousey," found a
gun, and charged him with possession of a concealed weapon.
The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the detective merely
had a hunch that the man he stopped and frisked was the man
about whom he had information. No evidence existed to elevate his
hunch into the reasonable suspicion required for an investigative
detention. The detective had discovered nothing to corroborate the
informant's tip, had acquired no evidence that the defendant had
Va. App. 1100, 407 S.E.2d 49 (1991). In view of the en banc decision in Bethea v. Common-
wealth, 14 Va. App. -, 419 S.E.2d 249 (1992), it is important to bear in mind that these
cases were decided by panels on which at least two of the judges were dissenting members of
the Bethea decision. See infra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
3. 12 Va. App. 404, 404 S.E.2d 77 (1991).
4. Id. at 406-07, 404 S.E.2d at 78; cf. Servis v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 371 S.E.2d
156 (1988).
5. 12 Va. App. 1100, 407 S.E.2d 49 (1991).
6. Id. at 1104, 407 S.E.2d at 52.
7. 12 Va. App. 37, 402 S.E.2d 496 (1991).
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ever been in the hotel room, and had offered no articulable reason
to believe that the man he stopped was committing a crime.8
Perhaps one of the more unexpected decisions this past year was
the en banc reversal" of the Court of Appeals' panel decision in
Bethea v. Commonwealth.'0 In this case, two police officers were
taking pictures while riding in an unmarked automobile. As they
photographed several young men riding in a car near them, the
passenger of that car, Bethea, noticed the picture-taking and began
to mug, waving and making faces. He was not shaking his fist,
pointing his finger, or making obscene gestures. Alarmed, the of-
ficers dropped back a bit and noticed that the vehicle did not have
a city decal. Since the failure to have a city decal on the car vio-
lated a city ordinance, the policemen stopped the car and began to
question the driver. Bethea, a passenger, was calm and did not
cause a disturbance. However, as a safety precaution, one of the
officers asked Bethea to step out of the car. When another officer
observed Bethea adjusting his pants, he pulled Bethea away from
the car. A bag of cocaine then dropped from Bethea's shorts, and
he was arrested. The panel held that the officer's order to Bethea
to step away from the car was an unlawful detention, one not justi-
fied by the circumstances and the public interest." The en banc
court differed, however, reaching its decision by more specific bal-
ancing. Instead of the broader balancing of the individual's interest
in personal privacy and security against the public interest in law
enforcement, the en banc court balanced the degree of the intru-
sion, which was found to be minimal, against the need of the police
officer to take protective measures. 12 The balance, viewed in this
light, was struck in the officer's favor.
8. Id.; accord Hardy v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 433, 399 S.E.2d 27 (1990). Compare
Harris v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 146, 400 S.E.2d 191 (1991), in which the detention and
frisk of the defendant were lawful. What was not lawful, however, was the officer's search of
the film canister retrieved from the defendant's pocket and believed to contain drugs. In
Harris, the tip and the officer's observation justified the detention. The tip and the officer's
hunch as to the contents of the canister did not, however, supply the necessary probable
cause. Id. at 151-52, 400 S.E.2d at 194.
9. Bethea v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. -, 419 S.E.2d 249 (1992).
10. 12 Va. App. 303, 404 S.E.2d 65 (1991).
11. Id. at 310, 404 S.E.2d at 67.
12. Bethea, 14 Va. App. at -, 419 S.E.2d at 251-52. In the context of an arrest, an
officer's needs to ensure his own safety and the integrity of the arrest are compelling. Wash-
ington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 7 (1982); see also Servis v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507,
517-18, 371 S.E.2d 156, 161 (1988) (discussing investigative detention); cf. Payne v. Com-
monwealth, 14 Va. App. 86, 414 S.E.2d 869 (1992).
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B. Search Warrants
In order to demonstrate probable cause based upon an inform-
ant's tip, an affidavit for a search warrant must "provide the mag-
istrate with the quality of information from which one reasonably
and objectively could conclude that the informer was worthy of be-
lief."' This showing can be accomplished by reciting facts about
the informer, or, to preserve anonymity, by presenting facts pro-
vided by the informer which evince personal knowledge of the in-
formation relayed. 4
In Boyd v. Commonwealth, 5 the affiant police officer described
information received from an anonymous informant. The defend-
ant argued that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable
cause, because the only corroboration of the informant's reliability
was the officer's confirmation of innocent, non-predictive informa-
tion (such as the target's address, a description of his car, and the
fact that his girlfriend lived with him)."
The Virginia Court of Appeals ruled that the character and na-
ture of the information supported the magistrate's finding of prob-
able cause. The court's ruling was based on several factors: 1) the
informant had personally observed the contraband; 2) he was more
than eighteen years old, a resident of the metropolitan area for one
year, had no criminal record, was responsibly employed, had used
cocaine, and wished to preserve his anonymity out of fear; 3) the
police officer had the informant's phone number, and could have
ascertained his identity; and 4) the details supplied by the inform-
ant, although relating only innocent conduct, were confirmed. 7
The Virginia Court of Appeals continued to rule on questions
relating to the execution of search warrants.'" In Meyers v. Com-
13. Boyd v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 179, 185, 402 S.E.2d 914, 918 (1991).
14. Id. at 187-88, 402 S.E.2d at 921-22.
15. 12 Va. App. 179, 402 S.E.2d 914 (1991).
16. Id. at 187-88, 402 S.E.2d at 921-22. Appellate courts have drawn a distinction between
predictive behavior and "past activity" or "easily obtained facts and conditions existing at
the time of the tip." See Adams v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 37, 41, 402 S.E.2d 496, 498
(1991) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245 (1983)); see also Hardy v. Common-
wealth, 11 Va. App. 433, 399 S.E.2d 27 (1990) (informant's tip was insufficient to establish
probable cause for a warrantless arrest).
17. Boyd, 12 Va. App. at 191, 402 S.E.2d at 921-22; see also Williams v. Commonwealth, 4
Va. App. 53, 69, 354 S.E. 279, 288 (1987).
18. The previous year's decisions included Gladden v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 595,
400 S.E.2d 791 (1991); Delacruz v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 335, 398 S.E.2d 103 (1990);
and Grover v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 143, 396 S.E.2d 863 (1990).
704 [Vol. 26:701
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monwealth,'9 the officer's entry pursuant to a search warrant was
not unlawful, even though he used a ruse to persuade an occupant
to open the door. Once the door was open, the officer announced
his true identity and purpose. One important aspect of the court's
holding was that the occupant did not try to close the door, and no
force was necessary to complete the entry.
The "good faith" exception of United States v. Leon 20 does not
apply where the affiant knowingly or recklessly includes a false
statement in his affidavit.' Once the defendant makes a "substan-
tial preliminary showing" that such a statement was included, and
where the disputed statement is necessary for a finding of probable
cause, the defendant is entitled to a hearing in order to prove his
contention.2 2 In two published Virginia cases raising a Franks chal-
lenge, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's findings that
a deliberate or reckless falsehood had not been proven.2
A defendant is not necessarily entitled to a Franks hearing. He
must first make a showing that the affidavit would not establish
probable cause without the allegedly false statements. The failure
to make this foundational showing was the basis for the court's
affirmance in Neustadter v. Commonwealth.2 4
In determining probable cause for the issuance of a search war-
rant, a magistrate may consider several affidavits containing facts
relevant to the same offense when presented simultaneously by the
same officer.2e
19. 12 Va. App. 398, 404 S.E.2d 83 (1991).
20. 468 U.S. 897 (1984); see also Miles v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 64, 408 S.E.2d 602
(1991) (good faith exception permitted admission of evidence seized pursuant to defective
search warrant).
21. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978); Lanier v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 541,
548-49, 394 S.E.2d 495, 500 (1990) (defendant failed to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that false information was provided to the magistrate).
22. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56.
23. See Moats v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 349, 404 S.E.2d 244 (1991); Lanier, 10 Va.
App. 541, 394 S.E.2d 495. In Moats, the defendant also argued that the affiant had failed to
include information in the affidavit which would have frustrated a determination of proba-
ble cause. The Virginia Court of Appeals held that probable cause would have been estab-
lished by the affidavit even if the missing information had been supplied. In any event, the
court reasoned, the Commonwealth was not required to include all of its information in an
affidavit. Moats, 12 Va. App. at 356, 404 S.E.2d at 247.
24. 12 Va. App. 273, 403 S.E.2d 391 (1991); see also Moats, 12 Va. App. 349, 404 S.E.2d
244.
25. Derr v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 413, 420, 410 S.E.2d 662, 666 (1991). The court also
discussed the requirements of § 19.2-54, its finding that the magistrate had a substantial
basis for his conclusion, and the good faith exception. Id. at 419-20, 410 S.E.2d at 665-66.
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C. Search Warrant Exceptions
The "plain view" exception was the subject of some discussion
by the court of appeals.26 An important prerequisite to the excep-
tion is that the seizable nature of the item must be immediately
apparent prior to the challenged activity. In Grimstead v. Com-
monwealth,27 the police officer saw a hemostat in a car ashtray, but
could not tell if any marijuana waspresent. He was not entitled to
pick up the hemostat and examine it more closely on the strength
of his suspicion. Probable cause was necessary 2 and did not exist
in this case.
A consensual search is deemed reasonable for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment. The consent upon which an officer relies,
however, must be voluntary. In Commonwealth v. Ealy,2e the Vir-
ginia Court of Appeals held that a non-resident had an expectation
of privacy in a garage which he used and kept locked. Further, the
court affirmed the trial court's finding that the third-party consent
to search was not voluntary and that the defendant's consent was
the product of an initial, unlawful search.
The court noted, but did not decide, an issue undecided in Vir-
ginia: whether consent to search is voluntary where police falsely
represent their ability to obtain a search warrant. 30
The Virginia courts have evinced a willingness to condone ac-
tions justified as necessary to protect the safety of officers and
others.3 Searches exceeding the bounds of a traditional frisk of the
person, which traditionally were permitted only as incidental to
lawful arrests, have been approved in the rubric of protective
sweeps,32 or as the product of a balancing of the degree of intrusion
against the need to ensure safety. The sweep search of the home
26. See Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 206, 409 S.E.2d 177 (1991); Grimstead v.
Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1066, 407 S.E.2d 47 (1991); Conway v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.
App. 711, 407 S.E.2d 310 (1991); Carson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 497, 404 S.E.2d 919
(1991).
27. 12 Va. App. 1066, 407 S.E.2d 47 (1991).
28. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323, 326-27 (1987).
29. 12 Va. App. 744, 407 S.E.2d 681 (1991).
30. Id. at 754 n.1, 407 S.E.2d at 687 n.1; see also Crosby v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App.
193, 198, 367 S.E.2d 730, 733 (1988) (defendant's acquiescence to a detective's statement
that he intended to get a search warrant did not constitute a consent to search).
31. See, e.g., Servis v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 517-18, 371 S.E.2d 156, 161 (1988).
32. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990).
33. Conway v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 711, 407 S.E.2d 310 (1991).
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of the defendant in Conway v. Commonwealth 4 was proper. In
view of the court's decision in Bethea, case law discussing the right
to make a protective sweep following the dissipation of the grounds
for the detention should follow. 5
III. CONFESSIONS AND INTERROGATION
The Court of Appeals' consideration of the admissibility of de-
fendants' incriminating statements has continued to focus primar-
ily on the issue of voluntariness.3 6
In making the legal determination of whether a statement is vol-
untary, the trial court must consider all circumstances, including
the details of the interrogation and the individual traits of the de-
fendant.3 7 Generally, the question will be whether the circum-
stances were such as to undermine the free will of the accused, or
to cause an innocent person to falsely confess.3 8
On the question of voluntariness, Virginia appellate courts have
accorded extraordinary deference to trial court findings.3 9 In Ven-
able v. Commonwealth,40 the defendant challenged the voluntari-
ness of statements he made while receiving treatment in a hospital
for several unsutured lacerations, one of which had exposed a ten-
don. He had lost one-third of his total blood volume, had ingested
cocaine, and had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.147.41 The trial
court found that the Commonwealth had proved the voluntariness
of the defendant's statements by a preponderance of the evidence.
Because this finding was supported by the evidence, the conviction
was affirmed.
34. Id.
35. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 35-36, 393 S.E.2d 599, 604 (1991);
Wilson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 549, 413 S.E.2d 655 (1992); Johnson v. Common-
wealth, 12 Va. App. 391, 404 S.E.2d 384 (1991); Mundy v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 461,
390 S.E.2d 525 (1990).
37. Terrell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 285, 403 S.E.2d 387 (1991). The circumstances
relating to the interrogation include the presence of trickery and deceit, psychological pres-
sure, threats or promises of leniency, and the duration of the questioning. Individual traits
include intelligence, education, prior experience with the police, the use of drugs or alcohol,
emotional or mental instability, and the deprivation of physical comfort. Id.
38. Id. at 292, 403 S.E.2d at 390; see, e.g., Tipton v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 256, 262, 295
S.E.2d 880, 883 (1982).
39. See, e.g., Mundy v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 461, 390 S.E.2d 525 (1990).
40. 12 Va. App. 348, 404 S.E.2d 374 (1991).
41. Id. at 360, 404 S.E.2d at 75.
1992]
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Several holdings discussed Miranda41 issues. Mier v. Common-
wealth,43 not surprisingly, held that the requirements of Miranda
do not apply to private security personnel. The value of the deci-
sion was a question which was acknowledged but left open:
whether "private security agents cooperating with the police or
working in conjunction with law enforcement agencies might be re-
quired to give the Miranda warnings prior to questioning."'44 In
this case, the cooperation of the private security agents "was
merely coincident to the performance of their private duties,""'
and the court distinguished those cases which involved "coordi-
nated private-public law enforcement" or subterfuge.
A recurring question in Miranda litigation is whether there has
been an invocation of the right to counsel. In Terrell v. Common-
wealth," the defendant's four references to his intention to "get a
lawyer" during interrogation did not constitute an invocation of his
right to counsel. Because the obligation to warn a suspect of his
rights arises only upon initiation of custodial interrogation, the is-
sue is often posed as to whether a particular encounter or exchange
constitutes custodial interrogation.47 In Nash v. Commonwealth,""
the court of appeals held that a traffic stop defendant was not in
custody for Miranda purposes."9 Finally, a delay in bringing the
defendant before a magistrate as required by Virginia Code section
19.2-800 did not require the suppression of his statements."
IV. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
As practitioners continued to confront different interpretations
and applications of Grady v. Corbin,'52 the court of appeals' willing-
ness to consider these double jeopardy issues has resulted in some
42. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
43. 12 Va. App. 827, 407 S.E.2d 342 (1991).
44. Id. at 833 n.1, 407 S.E.2d at 346 n.1.
45. Id. at 833, 407 S.E.2d at 346.
46. 12 Va. App. 285, 403 S.E.2d 387 (1991).
47. See, e.g., Lanier v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 541, 544-55, 394 S.E.2d 495, 503-04
(1990); Wass v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 27, 31-32, 359 S.E.2d 836, 838-39 (1987).
48. 12 Va. App. 550, 404 S.E.2d 743 (1991).
49. Id. at 552, 404 S.E.2d at 744; see also Cherry v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 135, 415
S.E.2d 242 (1992); Commonwealth v. Milner, 13 Va. App. 556, 413 S.E.2d 352 (1992).
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-80 (Rep. Vol. 1990).
51. Alatishe v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 376, 377, 404 S.E.2d 81, 82-83 (1991).
52. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
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degree of clarity.53 In Darnell v. Commonwealth,54 the court re-
versed the defendant's conviction for credit card theft where he
had been convicted previously of petit larceny for stealing the wal-
let which contained the cards. In Curtis v. Commonwealth,55 a
prosecution for attempted capital murder was not barred where
one of the two predicate rapes proven by the prosecution was a
crime for which the defendant had already been convicted in an-
other jurisdiction.55 In another case, separate convictions of hit and
run and evading police were not barred.57
The United States Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Halper58 is significant to the attorney whose client faces both civil
and criminal sanctions for the same conduct. For purposes of in-
voking the Fifth Amendment prohibition of double jeopardy, the
determinative question is not whether the sanction is labelled
criminal or civil, but whether the sanction may only fairly be char-
acterized as serving purposes of retribution or deterrence. If so, a
subsequent sanction of a like penal character for the same conduct
is barred.59 This holding was applied in Small v. Commonwealth,"
where the defendant had been found in civil contempt for violating
the terms of an earlier order of the trial court. He was ordered to
pay, in addition to other sums, $3,000 "in civil penalties for...
[his] willful and flagrant violations of the court's final order."'61
Prior to trial on a parallel criminal contempt charge, the defendant
moved to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. The court of ap-
peals (en banc) agreed with the defendant; citing Halper, they re-
versed the trial court.
6 2
53. See, e.g., Freeman v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 126, 414 S.E.2d 871 (1992); Stevens
v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 238, 415 S.E.2d 881 (1992).
54. 12 Va. App. 948, 408 S.E.2d 540 (1991) (applying Grady retroactively).
55. 13 Va.'App. 622, 414 S.E.2d 421 (1992) (en banc).
56. The court invoked a "jurisdictional exception" to the double jeopardy rule.
57. Treu v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 996, 406 S.E.2d 676 (1991); see also Martin v.
Commonwealth, 242 Va. 1, 406 S.E.2d 15 (1991) (discussing double jeopardy and the "same
conduct" rule); Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 625, 401 S.E.2d 208 (1991) (con-
victions for both destruction of private property (VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-137 (Cum. Supp.
1992)) and burglary (VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-91 (Cum. Supp. 1992)) did not violate prohibi-
tion against double jeopardy).
58. 492 U.S. 930 (1989).
59. Id.
60. 12 Va. App. 314, 398 S.E.2d 98 (1991) (en banc).
61. Id. at 317, 398 S.E.2d at 101.
62. Id.
19921
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Several double jeopardy questions were presented during 1991.
In Nelson v. Commonwealth,6- reconvening of court within fifteen
minutes of pronouncement of sentence to correct the intended sen-
tence did not violate double jeopardy.64 Ginanni v. Common-
wealth 5 held that a drug conspiracy conviction violated the double
jeopardy prohibition, and Lash v. Commonwealth6 provided the
analysis to be followed in resolving Code of Virginia section 19.2-
294 issues.6"
V. DUE PROCESS
The past year brought several due process decisions with impor-
tant practical application to the dilemma confronted by trial
courts and prosecutors in determining the extent of a defendant's
entitlement to discovery. 8 In White v. Commonwealth,9 the trial
court erred in not requiring the Commonwealth to divulge com-
pletely70 the confession of a confederate whose admission had been
summarized by the Commonwealth's attorney.71 Because the with-
held statement was material7 2 to White's preparation and defense,
63. 12 Va. App. 835, 407 S.E.2d 326 (1991).
64. Id. at 838-39, 407 S.E.2d at 328-29.
65. 13 Va. App. 1, 408 S.E.2d 767 (1991).
66. 13 Va. App. 251, 410 S.E.2d 689 (1991) (This case has been reargued en banc).
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-294 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
68. What does not exist cannot be disclosed. The failure to preserve potentially exculpa-
tory evidence is not a violation of due process absent bad faith. Tickell v. Commonwealth,
11 Va. App. 558, 400 S.E.2d 534 (1991).
69. 12 Va. App. 99, 402 S.E.2d 692 (1991).
70. The summary by the Commonwealth of the portions of the statement deemed excul-
patory was "conclusory and did not satisfy the obligation to produce the exculpatory mate-
rial." Id. at 102, 402 S.E.2d 694; accord, Lemons v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 668, 673
n.2, 414 S.E.2d 842, 845 n.2 (1992).
71. The third party had stated that he had shot the victim, that the defendant was pre-
sent, and that "they did the killing together." Although the full statement was not made a
part of the record, its exculpatory nature was evident in two respects. First, it tended to
show that someone else committed the crime. This proof rebutted the prosecutor's theory
that the defendant was the actual murderer. Second, even though the statement implicated
the defendant as a principal in the second degree, it mitigated his role in the offense, and
favored him on the issue of punishment. Id.
72. The court was realistic about making a determination of materiality from the record,
stating that the determination was to be made with an awareness of the difficulty of divin-
ing what the defendant would have done but for the prosecutor's failure to divulge. The
Court agreed that the defendant might have done nothing differently had the entire state-
ment been made available, yet spoke of the likelihood of additional advantage and success
otherwise. Id. at 104-05, 402 S.E.2d at 695-96. For a clearer example of materiality, see
Cherricks v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 96, 396 S.E.2d 397 (1990). But cf. Taitano v. Com-
monwealth, 4 Va. App. 342, 358 S.E.2d 590 (1987).
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the conviction was reversed.73 Conway v. Commonwealth74 held
that the defendant was prejudiced by the Commonwealth's failure
to provide him with the tape recorded statement he had made to
the case investigator. Although the defendant was told of the sub-
stance of his remarks, he did not know of the tape's existence until
it was played in rebuttal to his testimony. The prejudice arose in
his inability to review the tape and refresh his recollection of the
conversation. 6
In Crump v. Commonwealth, 6 the reference to an investigation
of two counts of burglary on a "warning and consent" form signed
by the defendant did not constitute evidence of other crimes or
offend considerations for exclusion of other-crime evidence. 7
VI. SIXTH AMENDMENT
Relatively few decisions dealt with the Sixth Amendment. Hall
v. Commonwealth"' held that the Sixth Amendment does not re-
quire a per se ban on post-hypnotic testimony.79 A delay, in ap-
pointing counsel in contravention of Code section 19.2-15810 does
not, in itself, violate the Sixth Amendment, absent prejudice. How-
ever, as explained in Graves v. Commonwealth,8' sufficient time is
required for counsel to become familiar with the case, confer with
the client, and prepare for trial.
73. 12 Va. App. at 105, 402 S.E.2d at 696. Whether the confederate's admission would
have been admissible at trial was not the determinative question as to its materiality. The
appellate court found significant that an extra-judicial statement (which is a broader cate-
gory than extra-judicial confession) might affect trial preparation, observing that it may
assist in the defendant's investigation, may be used to refresh a witnesses recollection or
serve as a past recollection recorded, and may be used otherwise in cross-examination. See
also Humes v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1140, 408 S.E.2d 553 (1991) (discussing the
consequences of a failure to disclose exculpatory evidence).
74. 12 Va. App. 711, 407 S.E.2d 310 (1991) (en bane).
75. Id. at 716, 407 S.E.2d at 313.
76. 13 Va. App. 286, 411 S.E.2d 238 (1991).
77. Id. at 289, 411 S.E.2d at 240.
78. 12 Va. App. 198, 403 S.E.2d 362 (1991).
79. Id. at 207, 403 S.E.2d at 367-68.
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-158 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
81. 12 Va. App. 53, 402 S.E.2d 500 (1991).
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VII. TRIALS
As it has for the past several years, the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals continued to accept a large number of cases presenting ques-
tions dealing with trial procedure.
A. Venue
In larceny cases, Code section 19.2-24582 provides venue in any
jurisdiction into which the defendant takes the stolen property. Al-
though larceny is a continuing offense, venue will not lie absent
proof that the defendant participated in the taking of the property
into the other jurisdiction."'
In a LaRouche prosecution, the trial court did not err in refusing
the defense motion for a change of venue.8 4
B. Speedy Trial
Pretrial delay, which did not violate the nine month provision of
Code section 19.2-243,11 likewise did not violate the defendant's
constitutional right to a speedy trial where there was no prejudice
to the defendant."6 In Taylor v. Commonwealth,87 the conviction
was reversed for failure to try the case within five months.8
C. Jurors
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Batson v.
Kentucky"9 and its practical application continue to present ques-
tions on appeal. In view of the United States Supreme Court's re-
cent application of the doctrine to defendants in criminal trials,90
the lessons of the appellate courts on both sides of the Batson ap-
plication are important to the parties in a criminal case.
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-245 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
83. Nelson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 268, 403 S.E.2d 384 (1991) (dicta).
84. Ascher v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1105, 408 S.E.2d 906 (1991).
85. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-243 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
86. Sheard v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 227, 403 S.E.2d 178 (1991).
87. 12 Va. App. 425, 404 S.E.2d 86 (1991).
88. Id. at 429-30, 404 S.E.2d at 88-89; see also Adkins v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 519,
414 S.E.2d 188 (1992); cf. Jones v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 566, 414 S.E.2d 193 (1992).
89. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
90. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
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One aspect of the prima facie showing necessary for a Batson
motion is a showing of facts from which an inference of racial mo-
tivation may be drawn. In Winfield v. Commonwealth,9 the show-
ing was adequately made by the prosecutor's striking of four of
nine blacks.92
Once the defense makes the requisite prima facie showing under
Batson, the mere articulation by the prosecutor of a racially neu-
tral explanation for his strikes may not be sufficient to rebut an
inference of racial motivation in jury selection. Once the Batson
showing is made and the explanation is given, the trial court must
determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimina-
tion. It is the duty of the trial court to scrutinize the sometimes
nebulous explanations offered by prosecutors to guard against the
use of subterfuge to confound the achievement of a racially bal-
anced cross-section of the community.9 4
In Moats v. Commonwealth,95 the court of appeals rejected the
defendant's challenge to the venire and the disparity between the
proportion of eligible blacks and the proportion of blacks on local
juries.9 6 In Harris v. Commonwealth97 the trial court abused its
discretion by denying the defendant's motion to inquire into effect
of extraneous information received by jury.
D. Evidence
Many of the year's cases from the Virginia Court of Appeals con-
cerned evidentiary questions, particularly questions related to
hearsay.9 8 In West v. Commonwealth,9 the murder victim's state
91. 12 Va. App. 446, 404 S.E.2d 398 (1991).
92. Id. at 450-51, 404 S.E.2d at 400-01.
93. See, e.g., Buck v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 10, 415 S.E.2d 229, reh'g granted Apr.
27, 1992; Jackson v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 176, 380 S.E.2d 1 (1989).
94. Langhorne v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 97, 107-08, 409 S.E.2d 476, 482-83 (1991).
95. 12 Va. App. 349, 404 S.E.2d 244 (1991).
96. Id. at 354, 404 S.E.2d at 246.
97. 13 Va. App. 47, 408 S.E.2d 599 (1991).
98. See Myrick v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 333, 412 S.E.2d 176 (1991)(certificate of
analysis properly admitted); Royal v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 928, 407 S.E.2d 346
(1991)(excited utterances); Alatishe v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 376, 404 S.E.2d 81
(1991) (a defendant's out-of-court statements need not be incriminating to be admissible as
a party admission); Mullins v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 372, 404 S.E.2d 237 (1991) (ad-
missibility of certificate of analysis conditioned upon requirements of VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
187 (Cum. Supp. 1992)); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 166, 174-77, 403 S.E.2d 375
(1991) (case involving dying declarations and excited utterances); Davis v. Commonwealth,
12 Va. App. 81, 402 S.E.2d 684 (1991) (hearsay is admissable, in the court's discretion, at a
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of mind was not relevant to any material issue, hence, the "state of
mind" hearsay exception was not applicable.'00 The murder convic-
tion was reversed in West, as well as in Royal v. Commonwealth.'0'
The reason for the latter reversal was the trial court's refusal to
admit an "excited utterance" as substantive evidence.' 0 2
The test for determining whether a statement qualifies as an
adoptive admission for hearsay exception purposes is whether,
under the circumstances, the statement was one which, if untrue,
called for a denial.'03
Several cases dealt with evidentiary questions which arise during
the examination and impeachment of witnesses. A "conviction"
does not occur until a final order is entered. 0 4 A defendant may
not be impeached by evidence of a jury verdict on which final judg-
ment has not been entered, 0 5 nor may his felony conviction be
named. 06
A witness may rely upon notes to refresh his memory if he has
some independent recollection of the circumstances about which
he is testifying.107 A prior consistent statement is relevant only to a
witness's credibility, and may not be offered as evidence of facts in
issue.1es
Other cases presented a myriad of evidentiary questions. In
White v. Commonwealth,' 9 the Virginia Court of Appeals indi-
cated that the refusal of the defendant's mother to talk to the
revocation hearing); Tickle v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 558, 400 S.E.2d 534 (1991) (evi-
dence improperly admitted under official records exception); Stokes v. Commonwealth, 11
Va. App. 550, 399 S.E.2d 453 (1991) (certificate of analysis properly admitted).
99. 12 Va. App. 906, 407 S.E.2d 22 (1991).
100. Id. at 910, 407 S.E.2d at 23. The opinion also discusses double hearsay, declarations
of a party opponent, and the rule that the burden is on the party offering hearsay to show
that the declaration falls within an exception.
101. 12 Va. App. 928, 407 S.E.2d 346 (1991).
102. Id. at 931, 407 S.E.2d at 348.
103. Weinbender v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 323, 327, 398 S.E.2d 106, 108 (1991) (en
banc) (the test was applied to a statement made by one of two drivers involved in an auto-
mobile accident).
104. Dowell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1145, 408 S.E.2d 263 (1991).
105. Id. at 1149, 408 S.E.2d at 265.
106. Powell v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 17, 409 S.E.2d 622 (1991). As to the use of a
juvenile conviction to impeach a witness, see Moats v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 349, 404
S.E.2d 244 (1991) (permitted in connection with a specific allegation of bias).
107. Potts v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1093, 408 S.E.2d 256 (1991).
108. Beverly v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 160, 164 n.1, 403 S.E.2d 175, 177 n.1 (1991).
109. 12 Va. App. 99, 402 S.E.2d 692 (1991).
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prosecutor was inadmissible. 11 0 In Creech v. Commonwealth,"' the
Virginia Supreme Court reversed a conviction permitting the de-
fendant's estranged wife to testify over the defendant's Code sec-
tion 19.2-271.2112 objection, even though her property was de-
stroyed by the defendant's arson." 3  And, in Wymer v.
Commonwealth,"4 the trial court was correct, under the circum-
stances, in not permitting the defendant to introduce his brother-
in-law's criminal record." 5
A defendant's failure to appear for trial constitutes evidence of
flight which is admissible to show guilt or consciousness of guilt."'
Reputation evidence may be offered as negative testimony, e.g.,
that the witness has never heard that the defendant had a reputa-
tion for a particular trait. 17 Whether a defendant has a reputation
for selling drugs does not establish a reputation for a character
trait, and is inadmissible."'
Expert testimony and the results of experimentation were prop-
erly admitted with regard to the speed of the defendant's automo-
bile prior to a fatal accident in Hubbard v. Commonwealth."9 The
trial court erred in admitting irrelevant and prejudicial photo-
graphs in a drug case, resulting in reversal,' 20 and other-crime evi-
dence was properly admitted in Crump v. Commonwealth'2' and
Cullen v. Commonwealth.'2'
110. See id. at 106, 402 S.E.2d at 696-97 (dicta).
111. 242 Va. 385, 410 S.E.2d 650 (1991).
112. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271.2 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
113. The Court reasoned that while the spousal privilege does not prohibit testimony in
cases involving offenses to the property and person of the testifying spouse, the defendant
was charged with arson, not an offense against his wife's property. Id. at 386-87, 410 S.E.2d
at 651.
114. 12 Va. App. 294, 403 S.E.2d 702 (1991).
115. Id. at 299, 403 S.E.2d at 706. The brother-in-law had stated that he would have the
defendant's house raided, and the defense inferred that the brother-in-law set the defendant
up. This statement, however, did not constitute the necessary direct evidence of a defense,
i.e., his intent to plant the contraband. Id.
116. Langhorne v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 97, 105-06, 409 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1991).
117. Chiles v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 698, 700, 406 S.E.2d 413, 415 (1991).
118. See id. at 700, 406 S.E.2d at 414; see also Robinson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App.
574, 413 S.E.2d 885 (1992).
119. 12 Va. App. 250, 403 S.E.2d 708 (1991), affd, 243 Va. 1, 413 S.E.2d 875 (1992).
120. Morris v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 134, 409 S.E.2d 629 (1991).
121. 13 Va. App. 286, 411 S.E.2d' 238 (1991) (vague references to other crimes or investi-
gation were harmlessly irrelevant).
122. 13 Va. App. 17, 409 S.E.2d 487 (1991) (where evidence that proves a murder charge
also relates to grand larceny charges, the evidence of the murder charge would properly be
admitted in the grand larceny trial).
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E. Instructions
The purpose of jury instructions and the duty of the trial court
in this respect were the subject of several decisions.123 The duty to
instruct on a lesser-included offense received an interesting appli-
cation in Moats v. Commonwealth.2 " The defendant robbed the
victim at gunpoint and then shot him three times. Over the de-
fendant's challenge, the Virginia Court of Appeals approved the
giving of instructions for first and second degree murder rather
than instructions for capital murder. 125
Two other decisions dealt with the responsibility of the trial
court to instruct. Where the defense presents an incorrectly-stated
instruction on a principal of law materially vital to the defense, the
trial judge must correct and give the instruction.1 26
F. Sentencing
Most decisions of the court of appeals regarding sentencing dealt
with the law surrounding the imposition and revocation of sus-
pended sentences of incarceration.2 7 Incarceration is a proper con-
dition of a suspended sentence.-1 8 A suspended sentence may be
revoked upon evidence of a subsequent conviction, 12 irrespective
of the facts underlying the conviction, or whether the new crime
123. See Martin v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 524, 414 S.E.2d 401 (1992) (en banc)
(duty of trial court to instruct on lesser-included offense); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.
App. 419, 404 S.E.2d 78 (1991) (purpose of jury instructions is to provide guidance to the
jury and it must support the case evidence); Harrison v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 581,
405 S.E.2d 854 (1991) (duty of trial court to instruct on lesser-included offense).
124. 12 Va. App. 349, 404 S.E.2d 244 (1991).
125. The court's reasoning was not what the defense bar expects when a defendant seeks
an instruction for capital murder: "The jury could have found that the shots were fired by
appellant in a fearful response to the victim reaching under the counter. From this the jury
could have found that the killing was not willful, deliberate and premeditated." Id. at 357,
404 S.E.2d at 248.
126. Mery v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 821, 826, 407 S.E.2d 18, 21 (1991); Kil v. Com-
monwealth, 12 Va. App. 802, 811-12, 407 S.E.2d 674, 679 (1991).
127. See, e.g., Bryce v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 589, 414 S.E.2d 417 (1992) (fraudu-
lent concealment of identity and probationary status sufficient to reduce suspended sen-
tence); Cottrell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 570, 405 S.E.2d 438 (1991) (finding no error
in revocation of suspended sentence).
128. Nuckoles v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1083, 407 S.E.2d 355 (1991). VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-203 (Cum. Supp. 1992) "places wide discretion in the trial court to determine what
conditions are to be imposed in each particular case." Id. at 1085, 407 S.E.2d at 356.
129. Patterson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1046, 407 S.E.2d 43 (1991). This decision
also held that the execution of a revoked suspended sentence may be postponed during the
pendency of an appeal, and the defendant may be eligible for bail. Where the conviction
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was committed while the execution of the sentence was suspended
pending an appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court.130 A court may
not revoke previously suspended, concurrent sentences and impose
them consecutively. 13 A court loses jurisdiction to revoke sus-
pended sentences where it fails to issue a bench warrant and de-
tainer in a timely fashion. 32
G. Argument
The prosecutor's closing argument in Jackson v. Common-
wealth,3 ' which addressed the general effects of cocaine on society
and urged a sentence which would deter drug distribution by the
defendant, was not improper.134
H. Severance
In Spence v. Commonwealth,3 " the trial court erred in not sev-
ering the trial of four drug distribution charges. The four sales did
not meet the requirement of "the same act or transaction";136 the
defendant's statements to the person who made each of the four
purchases were "merely the assurances of a salesman" and did not
evidence connected transactions.1 37
I. Miscellaneous
Certain motions must be filed within a particular time prior to
trial, or the challenge is waived. Where, however, the trial court
considers and rules upon an untimely motion, the necessary leave
of court is provided implicitly. 38
underlying a revocation is affirmed, the appeal of the revocation will be dismissed. If the
conviction is reversed, the revocation must be reversed. Id. at 1049, 407 S.E.2d at 45.
130. Singleton v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 575, 400 S.E.2d 205 (1991).,
131. Wood v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1257, 408 S.E.2d 568 (1991).
132. Vaughan v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 924, 406 S.E.2d 419 (1991).
133. 12 Va. App. 798, 406 S.E.2d 415 (1991).
134. Id. As prosecutors have become more aggressive in making this type of argument,
the difference between making an argument for sentencing (which is proper) and on convic-
tion (which is improper) has sometimes become lost or confused. Jackson contains language
which might well be adapted into a cautionary instruction.
135. 12 Va. App. 1040, 407 S.E.2d 916 (1991).
136. Id. at 1042, 407 S.E.2d at 917.
137. Id. at 1043, 407 S.E.2d at 918.
138. Winfield v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 446, 448 n.1, 404 S.E.2d 398, 399 n.1 (1991)
(Batson challenge was not made until after the jury had been sworn).
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A witness other than the accused is incompetent to testify about
matters recalled for the first time after hypnosis.139 A witness who
has been hypnotized is not incompetent as to all matters, however,
and may testify to facts which are adequately documented as hav-
ing been recalled pre-hypnosis. The court of appeals recom-
mended, but did not require, adherence to specified guidelines.140
A defendant may be tried in his absence under certain circum-
stances, but must be shown to have made a knowing and intelli-
gent waiver of the right to be present. The trial court may not as-
sume that a defendant's absence is voluntary; moreover, voluntary
absence, without more, does not constitute a knowing and intelli-
gent waiver. The defendant's knowledge of the consequences must
be proven.141
In Carter v. Commonwealth,'42 the trial court should have con-
sidered counsel's allegations of conflict of interest. Under the cir-
cumstances of another case, the trial court did not err in denying a
mid-trial request by the defendant for a continuance. 43
The defendant in Day v. Commonwealth4 4 waived his challenge
to the Commonwealth's proof of venue by failing to renew it at the
conclusion of the evidence. 45 His motion to set aside the jury's
verdict as being contrary to the law and the evidence "to save the
point" was not sufficiently particular. 46
VIII. APPEALS
The creation of the Virginia Court of Appeals, and its willing-
ness to consider many unsettled questions previously resolved in a
piecemeal fashion by trial courts, has brought an increased reliance
on appellate litigation. With the court of appeals' numerous rul-
ings, however, a body of appellate law has arisen which has at
times seemed more exclusionary than accommodating.
Many practitioners have learned, through the published cases,
that common practices adopted and traditionally relied upon to es-
139. Hall v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 198, 210, 403 S.E.2d 362, 370 (1991).
140. Id. at 212, 403 S.E.2d at 371.
141. Hunter v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 18, 409 S.E.2d 483 (1991).
142. 11 Va. App. 569, 400 S.E.2d 540 (1991).
143. Kil v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 802, 813-14, 407 S.E.2d 674, 680-81 (1991).
144. 12 Va. App. 1078, 407 S.E.2d 52 (1991).
145. Id. at 1079, 407 S.E.2d at 53.
146. Id.
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tablish an appellate record are inadequate. In Day v. Common-
wealth,147 the defendant unsuccessfully challenged the Common-
wealth's proof of venue. Upon return of the jury's guilty verdict,
defense counsel moved to set aside the verdict as being contrary to
the law and the evidence "to save the point." The court of appeals
held that the defendant waived his challenge by failing to renew it
at the conclusion of the evidence. 48 The motion to set aside the
verdict was not sufficiently particular. 149
One general rule that has emerged is that "error is presumed to
be prejudicial unless it plainly appears that it could not have af-
fected the result.' 50 Once error is established, the burden shifts to
the opposing party to prove otherwise.' 5 ' While the prosecution's
burden has seemed, to defense lawyers, increasingly easy to sustain
in recent years, 52 this past year, the court of appeals declined to
make the characterization. In Beverly v. Commonwealth,'5 ' a wit-
ness's improperly-admitted prior consistent statement was clearly
inculpatory, could have caused the defendant's conviction, and was
not harmless. 54 In Lavinder v. Commonwealth,55 the improper
impeachment of the defendant's credibility was not harmless. 15 6
A mixed question was presented in White v. Commonwealth. 57
Prior to the trial, the prosecutor summarized the admissions of a
third party who confessed to the crime for which the defendant
had been charged. The description of the confederate's confession
was sufficient to establish its exculpatory nature, and so it was er-
ror for the trial court not to have ordered the disclosure of the
entire text of the statement. 8 Without the entire text, however,
the Virginia Court of Appeals was unable to determine its materi-
ality, and hence, was unable to determine whether the case should
147. 12 Va. App. 1078, 407 S.E.2d 52 (1991).
148. Id. at 1079, 407 S.E.2d at 53.
149. Cf. Campbell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 476, 405 S.E.2d 1 (1991).
150. Royal v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 928, 932, 407 S.E.2d 346, 348 (1991).
151. Beverly v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 160, 164, 403 S.E.2d 175, 177 (1991).
152. See, e.g., Winston v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 363, 404 S.E.2d 239 (1991). In this
case, the prosecutor's argument and the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury to disregard
the improper comment constituted error, but it was harmless. Id. at 371, 404 S.E.2d at 242.
153. 12 Va. App. 160, 403 S.E.2d 175.
154. Id. at 164, 403 S.E.2d at 177.
155, 12 Va. App. 1003, 407 S.E.2d 910 (1991).
156. Id. at 1010, 407 S.E.2d at 914. The court of appeals also discussed the test for the
determination of whether constitutional and non-constitutional error is harmless. See id. at
1005-06, 407 S.E.2d at 911.
157. 12 Va. App. 99, 402 S.E.2d 692 (1991).
158. Id. at 105, 402 S.E.2d at 694.
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be remanded for retrial.159 The court's solution was to remand the
case to the trial court to determine the materiality issue.160
Somewhat more subtle lessons in appellate litigation are found
in the language and holdings of recent decisions. The court of ap-
peals has seemed more sensitive to the reality of criminal trial
practice. In White v. Commonwealth,'' for example, the court ac-
cepted and described the likelihood of success of a defendant's
proffered strategy had he been provided with the full text of the
confession of a confederate. 1 2 The prejudicial effect of challenged
photographs outweighed their probative value in a drug case, 63
and in several cases, the trial court was held to have abused its
discretion.16 4
The court of appeals seemed ambivalent during the past year
about certain police practices. Discussing the validity of a third-
party consent to search, the court found significant an individual's
ignorance of whether a search warrant was required and whether
grounds even existed to obtain one.6 5 Where a police officer falsely
told the defendant that he had obtained incriminating fingerprints,
the court expressed its mild disapproval, stating, "[w]hile we do
not condone conduct wherein fake representations are made, the
statement made by the officer did not constitute reversible
error."'
166
159. Id.
160. Id. at 106, 402 S.E.2d at 696; see also Darnell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 948,
951 n.1, 408 S.E.2d 540, 541 n.1 (1991) (where a writ of certiorari was issued to include the
arrest warrant as a part of the record).
161. 12 Va. App. 99, 402 S.E.2d 692 (1991).
162. Id. at 104-05, 402 S.E.2d at 695-96.
163. Morris v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 134, 409 S.E.2d 629 (1991). The panel opinion
was later vacated, however, and the trial court judgment affirmed in Morris v. Common-
wealth, 14 Va. App. 283, 416 S.E.2d 462 (1992) (en banc).
164. See Taylor v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 419, 404 S.E.2d 78 (1991) (trial court
abused its discretion in not giving mature consideration to the defendant's request for the
Alcohol Safety Action Program (ASAP), even though the defendant denied that he had a
drinking problem); Harris v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 47, 408 S.E.2d 599 (1991) (trial
court abused its discretion by denying the defendant's motion to inquire into the effect of
extraneous information received by the jury); Conway v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 711,
407 S.E.2d 310 (1991) (trial court abused its discretion by admitting a tape of the defend-
ant's statement to a detective that was made without defendant's knowledge and not pro-
vided to defendant before its admission on rebuttal).
165. Commonwealth v. Ealy, 12 Va. App. 744, 407 S.E.2d 681 (1991).
166. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 391, 393 n.1, 404 S.E.2d 384, 386 n.1 (1991);
see also Wilson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 549, 554, 413 S.E.2d 655, 658 (1992).
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Other decisions indicated the extent to which the appellate court
is willing to defer to the findings of the trial court. A statement
made by a wounded defendant, who was covered in excrement and
had a blood alcohol content of 0.147, was supported by the evi-
dence and found to be voluntary. The court stated: "Sergeant
Schockley described the appellant as nervous and stated he de-
tected the odor of alcohol but felt that the appellant was not
drunk."' 7 Distinguishing the case before it from that of a twenty-
three-year-old defendant's IQ of sixty-seven, 6 " the court found it
significant that here "[t]he defendant . . had a ninth grade
education."' 69
Finally, in an upset to conventional wisdom and belief, the Vir-
ginia Court of Appeals twice cited, with approval, a California case
for its analysis of an issue. 70 As surprising as this nod may have
been, it was consistent with the court's reference to a number of
diverse authorities.' 7 '
167. Venable v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 358, 361, 404 S.E.2d 74, 76 (1991) (emphasis
added).
168. Terrell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 285, 403 S.E.2d 387 (1991) (discussing Wash-
ington v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 535, 323 S.E.2d 577 (1984)).
169. Terrell, 12 Va. App. at 291, 403 S.E.2d at 390.
170. See Hall v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 198, 207 n.2, 403 S.E.2d 362, 368 n.2 (1991);
White v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 99, 102, 402 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1991); see also Neu-
stadter v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 273, 279, 403 S.E.2d 391, 394 (1991) (Benton, J.,
dissenting).
171. The Virginia Court of Appeals cited the following authorities in the cases indicated:
RONALD J. BACIGAL. VIRGINIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1989), cited in Terrell v. Com-
monwealth, 12 Va. App 285, 291, 403 S.E.2d 387, 390 (1991) and Walker v. Commonwealth,
12 Va. App. 438, 443, 404 S.E.2d 394, 396 (1991); CHARLES E. FRIEND, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
IN VIRGINIA (3d ed. 1988), cited in Wymer v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 294, 299, 403
S.E.2d 702, 706 (1991), Alatishe v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 376, 378, 404 S.E.2d 81, 82
(1991) and Royal v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 928, 931, 407 S.E.2d 346, 348 (1991);
CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984),
cited in Weinbender v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 323, 326, 398 S.E.2d 106, 108 (1991)
and Alatishe v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 376, 378, 404 S.E.2d 81, 82 (1991); WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW (1986), cited in Fortune v. Commonwealth,
12 Va. App. 643, 647, 406 S.E.2d 47, 49 (1991); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY (3rd ed. 1986), cited in Kil v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 802, 809, 407 S.E.2d 674,
678 (1991); MICHIs'S JURISPRUDENCE (1984), cited in Walker v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App.
438, 443, 404 S.E.2d 394, 396 (1991); VA. L. REV., cited in Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.
App. 1003, 1006, 407 S.E.2d 910, 912 (1991) and Fortune v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App.
643, 648, 406 S.E.2d 47, 49 (1991); MODEL PENAL CODE, cited in Fortune v. Commonwealth,
12 Va. App. 643, 648-49, 406 S.E.2d 47, 49 (1991); FED. R. EVID., cited in Alatishe v. Com-
monwealth, 12 Va. App. 376, 378, 404 S.E.2d 81, 82 (1991); Federal circuit courts, cited in
Winston v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 363, 367, 404 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1991); and cases
representing the majority and minority views of an jssue, cited in Hall v. Commonwealth, 12
Va. App. 198, 403 S.E.2d 362 (1991).
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IX. CRIMES
A. Homicide
The Virginia Supreme Court continued to affirm capital murder
convictions in 1991,172 with one exception. The conviction in Rog-
ers v. Commonwealth173 was reversed on the grounds that the evi-
dence was insufficient to prove that the defendant had acted as the
"triggerman."
The Virginia Court of Appeals found the evidence to be suffi-
cient in each of its murder cases. 174
Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible in defense of
capital and first degree murder cases to prove an inability to pre-
meditate. However, the court of appeals held in Bowling v. Com-
monwealth175 that evidence of diminished mental capacity is not
admissible for the same purpose, or as a defense to the element of
specific intent.17
Davis v. Commonwealth177 presented the question of whether a
defendant who committed the felony of driving in violation of his
habitual offender status could be convicted of murder under the
felony-murder doctrine. Affirming the conviction, the court held
that a "mere nexus" between the felony and the death would not
be sufficient; the accidental death would have to be causally re-
lated to the commission of the felony. 17 A homicide would be con-
sidered to have been committed in the perpetration of the felony if
it could be considered as being within the res gestae of the under-
lying felony and emanating therefrom. 179 In Davis, the defendant
was driving recklessly so as to avoid being caught committing the
172. See George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 411 S.E.2d 12 (1991); Yeatts v. Common-
wealth, 242 Va. 121, 410 S.E.2d 254 (1991); Saunders v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 107, 406
S.E.2d 39 (1991).
173. 242 Va. 307, 410 S.E.2d 621 (1991).
174. See Fordham v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 235, 409 S.E.2d 829 (1991), af'd, 243
Va. 236, 415 S.E.2d 218 (1992) (evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction of first
degree murder); Cable v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 565, 405 S.E.2d 444 (1991), af'd, 243
Va. 236, 415 S.E.2d 218 (1992) (evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction of involun-
tary manslaughter in a hunting accident case); Bell v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 530, 399
S.E.2d 450 (1991) (evidence was sufficient to establish a specific intent to kill).
175. 12 Va. App. 166, 403 S.E.2d 375 (1991).
176. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 243, 389 S.E.2d 871, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
221 (1990); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 707, 324 S.E.2d 682 (1985).
177. 12 Va. App. 408, 404 S.E.2d 377 (1991).
178. Id. at 411, 404 S.E.2d at 379.
179. Id.
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felony of driving after having been declared an habitual of-
fender. 180 The doctrine was properly invoked.
The trial court in Moats v. Commonwealth'8 ' had given an in-
struction on second degree murder as a lesser-included offense over
the objection of the defendant. The Virginia Court of Appeals ap-
proved the giving of the instruction with surprising reasoning,
given that the defendant had robbed the victim at gunpoint and
then shot him three times:
The jury could have found that the shots were fired by appellant in
a fearful response-to the victim reaching under the counter. From
this the jury could have found that the killing was not willful, delib-
erate and premeditated.182
B. Drugs
A common issue in drug cases is the sufficiency of the evidence
to establish possession 83 or intent to distribute.8 The sufficiency
question as it relates to the intent to distribute was grounds for
reversal in Stanley v. Commonwealth s5 because the Common-
wealth failed to prove that the defendant's possession of the drugs
and his intent to distribute them were contemporaneous.
The Commonwealth's proof of intent to distribute often includes
testimony from a narcotics detective that the amount of drug pos-
sessed is inconsistent with personal use. In Davis v. Common-
180. Id. at 413, 404 S.E.2d at 380.
181. 12 Va. App. 349, 404 S.E.2d 244 (1991).
182. Id. at 356-57, 404 S.E.2d at 248. As attenuated as this theory might seem, the Vir-
ginia Court of Appeals in several instances declined to reject creative proffers.
183. See, e.g., Wymer v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 294, 403 S.E.2d 702 (1991). The
issue concerning sufficiency of evidence arose in two cases involving a drug "throwdown." In
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 150, 402 S.E.2d 502 (1991), the facts surrounding
the unobserved throwdown were sufficiently distinguishable from Gordon v. Commonwealth,
212 Va. 298, 183 S.E.2d 735 (1971), to sustain the verdict. The evidence was likewise suffi-
cient in Beverly v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 160, 403 S.E.2d 175 (1991), rev'd on other
grounds, although Gordon was not discussed.
184. See Morton v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 6, 408 S.E.2d 583 (1991) (evidence found
insufficient); Collins v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 177, 409 S.E.2d 175 (1991) (evidence
found sufficient); Hambury v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 435, 350 S.E.2d 524 (1986) (evi-
dence found sufficient).
185. 12 Va. App. 867, 407 S.E.2d 13 (1991) (en banc).
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wealth,186 the Virginia Court of Appeals held that similar testi-
mony did not constitute an opinion on the ultimate issue. 187
In Satterfield v. Commonwealth,'8 the defendant was arrested
while in possession of 0.78 grams of cocaine in three packages
which he admittedly intended to sell. The trial court allowed into
evidence portions of his confession in which he described generally
his prior purchases from the same source, and subsequent sales.
The court of appeals ruled that the trial court did not err, because.
"proof of the prior distribution was. included in an admission, was
explanatory of the offense charged and was relevant to prove an
essential element of the charged crime."' 9
The Palafox doctrine provides that one who distributes a sample
of drugs and retains the remainder for the purpose of making an
immediate distribution to the same recipient, at the same place
and at the same time, may only be punished for one offense. 90
While the Virginia Court of Appeals did not hold that this case
accurately described Virginia law, its consideration of the Palafox
doctrine in Meyers v. Commonwealth'9' hinted at acceptance.
C. Conspiracy
An often-encountered question in conspiracy cases is whether
the circumstances establish one or several separate conspiracies.
An en banc Virginia Court of Appeals decision provided guidance
in the resolution of this question. 92 Ruling on another familiar is-
sue which arises with the involvement of an informant or under-
cover agent in the investigation of a conspiracy, the court held that
the crime of conspiracy requires a bilateral meeting of the minds,
not a unilateral belief of agreement. 193
186. 12 Va. App. 728, 406 S.E.2d 922 (1991).
187. Id. at 731-32, 406 S.E.2d at 924. But see Llamera v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 262, 414
S.E.2d 597 (1992).
188. 14 Va. App. -, 420 S.E.2d 228 (June 9, 1992) (en banc).
189. Id. at 231.
190. United States v. Palafox, 764 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1985).
191. 12 Va. App. 398, 404 S.E.2d 83 (1991).
192. Williams v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 912, 407 S.E.2d 319 (1991) (en banc). The
evidence was sufficient to support two separate convictions of conspiracy to distribute mari-
juana to an inmate. The evidence was insufficient to prove that five other convictions were
for separate agreements.
193. Fortune v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 643, 406 S.E.2d 47 (1991). The court dis-
cussed these two theories of conspiracy and the rules of statutory interpretation in reversing
the conviction for conspiracy alleged between the defendant, a police officer, and an inform-
ant. Id.
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D. Sex Offenses
The past year's cases involving sex offenses dealt largely with the
sufficiency of the evidence to prove specific elements of the
crime."" In Myers v. Commonwealth,'95 the victim's subjective fear
of the defendant, and of having to walk back through the woods,
was sufficient to establish the elements of force, threat, or intimi-
dation, even though the defendant had no weapon, and had made
no threat of physical harm. In another case, the appellate court
affirmed the trial court's decision not to strike the evidence as to
the victim's physical helplessness under Code section 18.2-
67.10(4)19" where the rape was accomplished while she was not
fully awake.197 The defendant's status as the victim's teacher in
Clark v. Commonwealth98 did not satisfy the requirement of a
sexual assault achieved through force, threat or intimidation.
E. Burglary and Larceny
Neither common law trespass'99 nor the statutory crime of un-
lawful entry2°° is a lesser-included offense of burglary. The crime
of uttering a bad check is not a "like" offense for purposes of en-
hanced punishment under Code section 18.2-103211 which deals
with willful concealment of merchandise. 0 2
The recent, unexplained, exclusive possession of stolen property
by the defendant permits the inference that he committed the
theft. In Nelson v. Commonwealth,2 °' the admittedly unexplained
presence of a defendant's fingerprints inside a stolen truck proved
only that he had been inside the truck after it had been stolen.
Because the presence of the prints did not prove the defendant's
dominion and control of the truck, the Commonwealth was not en-
titled to the inference. 20
4
194. See, e.g., Lawson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 109, 409 S.E.2d 466 (1991)(evidence
insufficient to sustain conviction of sodomy).
195. 11 Va. App. 634, 400 S.E.2d 803 (1991).
196. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.10(4) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
197. Woodward v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 118, 402 S.E.2d 244 (1991).
198. 12 Va. App. 1163, 408 S.E.2d 564 (1991).
199. See Taylor v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 649, 400 S.E.2d 794 (1991).
200. See Crump v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 286, 441 S.E.2d 238 (1991).
201. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-103 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
202. Snead v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 643, 400 S.E.2d 806 (1991).
203. 12 Va. App. 268, 403 S.E.2d 384 (1991).
204. Id. at 271, 403 S.E.2d at 386.
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While fraud may be alleged by an indictment charging grand lar-
ceny, the defendant may require the Commonwealth to elect the
statute under which it intends to proceed. 205 This election often
involves an academic resolution of the distinction between larceny,
larceny by trick, larceny by false pretenses, and, as suggested by
Zoretic v. Commonwealth,20 6 embezzlement. In Zoretic, the evi-
dence was insufficient to sustain the conviction of embezzlement,
because the Commonwealth was unable to prove that the defend-
ant had converted funds to his own use.207
Rulings of the Virginia Court of Appeals were significant in two
cases involving fraud. In Klink v. Commonwealth" s the court
ruled that evidence of failure to perform and failure to return an
advance, despite request by certified mail, was insufficient, stand-
ing alone, to establish the requisite fraudulent intent. The case of
Ascher v. Commonwealth21 9 is the first published decision in Vir-
ginia pertaining to criminal securities fraud.
Other decisions concerned the elements of the offenses and the
sufficiency of the evidence in forgery and worthless check cases.21 0
F. Motor Vehicle Offenses
Several appellate court decisions concerned issues peculiar to
DUI prosecutions. The breath test proscribed by Code section
18.2-267211 measures blood alcohol concentration at the time of the
test itself, and not necessarily at the time of the offense. Hence, an
instruction that breath test evidence was of the blood alcohol con-
tent at the time of the offense was incorrect." Where the defend-
ant was charged with driving while having a blood alcohol concen-
205. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
206. 13 Va. App. 241, 409 S.E.2d 832 (1991).
207. Although the court expressly did not reach the issue of whether a trust relationship
had been established, such a relationship might not be required, depending upon the rules
of statutory interpretation, in view of the language of VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Repl. Vol.
1988).
208. 12 Va. App. 815, 407 S.E.2d 5 (1991).
209. 12 Va. App. 1105, 408 S.E.2d 906 (1991).
210. Beiler v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 291, 415 S.E.2d 849 (1992) (evidence of check al-
terations sufficient for jury to find forgery and uttering); Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 13
Va. App. 194, 409 S.E.2d 818 (1991) (evidence sufficient in forgery case); Campbell v. Com-
monwealth, 13 Va. App. 33, 409 S.E.2d 21 (1991) (requirement of prejudice to another in
prosecution for forgery of public record); Bagheri v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1071, 408
S.E.2d 259 (1991) (evidence sufficient to sustain conviction for worthless checks).
211. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-267 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
212. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 419, 404 S.E.2d 78 (1991).
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tration of 0.10 pursuant to Code section 18.2-266(i),213 it was error
to instruct the jury on the presumption that the defendant was
under the influence.214
In a prosecution for DUI, evidence of the defendant's refusal to
take a field sobriety test was not barred by the Fifth Amendment
or Article I, Section 8, of the Virginia Constitution.215
The circumstantial evidence was insufficient in Potts v. Com-
monwealth21 to prove DUI. The appellate court distinguished
Potts from Lyons v. City of Petersburg,217 a case where the DUI
was sufficiently established by circumstantial evidence.
The habitual offender order in Davis v. Commonwealth21s did
not contain the language required by Code section 46.2-358219 stat-
ing that the revocation would remain in effect until the driving
privileges were restored. It only revoked the defendant's privilege
to drive for ten years "from the date of this order. ' 220 The defend-
ant was arrested fourteen years later and charged with driving af-
ter having been declared an habitual offender and while the order
of the court was still in effect. Because ten years had elapsed, the
defendant should not have been convicted of the felony. 2 1
Virginia Code section 46.2-357 prohibits an habitual offender
from driving a motor vehicle. The defendant's actions in touching
wires together on a broken-down motorcycle, creating sparks, were
held to be "driving" in violation of the statute.222 This result was
obtained by extending cases decided under Code section 18.2-
266,223 which prohibits the driving or operation of a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol.224
In a hit and run case, the Commonwealth must prove that the
defendant had "actual knowledge of the occurrence of the acci-
213. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266(i) (Cum. Supp. 1992).
214. Taylor, 12 Va. App. at 422-23, 404 S.E.2d at 80.
215. Farmer v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 337, 404 S.E.2d 371 (1991)(en banc).
216. 12 Va. App. 1093, 408 S.E.2d 256 (1991).
217. 221 Va. 10, 266 S.E.2d 880 (1980).
218. 12 Va. App. 246, 402 S.E.2d 711 (1991).
219. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-358 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
220. Davis, 12 Va. App. at 247 n.2, 402 S.E.2d at 712 n.2 (1991).
221. Id.
222. Rosenbaum v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 61, 402 S.E.2d 498 (1991).
223. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
224. Id. (emphasis added). See also Kil v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 802, 809, 407
S.E.2d 674, 678 (1991) (discussing the definition of "driver").
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dent, and such knowledge of injury which would be attributed to a
reasonable person under the circumstances of the case. '225
X. CONCLUSION
Because of the willingness of the Virginia Court of Appeals to
accept a diverse and heavy caseload, participants in the Virginia
criminal justice system must no longer resort to a case-by-case res-
olution of the issues in the trial court. Instead, the idea of criminal
appellate litigation has become a reality, displacing the tradition of
reliance on the trial court as the final arbiter of the law. Criminal
trial practice has benefitted, not only from the resolution of the
numerous issues presented over the past several years, but also
from the emergence of a need for a well-preserved and complete
record.
Still, the criminal law practitioner must heed the tremendous
deference that appellate courts accord to findings by trial courts on
factual predicates and conclusions of law. The lesson remains a
simple one - zealous and effective representation must be geared
toward success at the trial court level.
225. Id. at 811, 407 S.E.2d at 679.
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